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Single neurons in several brain areas intervening between sensation and action signal the accumulation of
sensory evidence favoring a particular behavioral response. Two new studies show that these same neurons
encode decision confidence and that decisionmakers continue to process relevant sensory information even
after a choice has been made.The standard paradigm for probing sen-
sory decision making, the two-alternative
forced choice task (2AFC), bears striking
resemblance to the problem confronted
by a soccer goalkeeper defending a
penalty kick—albeit without the legions
of noisy fans. The average penalty kick
clocks in at a speed of around 20 m/s,
leaving the average goalkeeper, stationed
11 m away, somewhere in the neighbor-
hood of half a second to decide whether
to dive left or right. Before the ball reaches
the goal line, the keeper must use sensory
information to estimate its speed and
trajectory, project its likely location by
the time it reaches him, and plan a dive
that will intercept it in time. Intuitively,
the more obvious the kicker’s move-
ments, the faster and more accurately
the keeper will react. And, indeed, psy-
chophysical, computational, and neuro-
physiological studies have endorsed this
intuition by showing that the neural pro-
cesses responsible for rendering such
a decision integrate sensory evidence
over time, initiating action when a thresh-
old is reached.
As informative as such studies have
been, they tend to overlook more
nuanced aspects of decision making.
For example, because the keeper’s reac-
tion time is nearly as long as the travel
time, he must often act on the basis
of highly ambiguous information, even
though the result may be no better than
a guess. Even worse, a kick may bend
mid-air on its way toward the goal,
requiring a nearly impossible mid-air cor-
rection. No doubt the speed of the ball
and the ability of the kicker to disguise
his shot will influence both the keeper’s
confidence in his decision and his ability724 Neuron 63, September 24, 2009 ª2009to change his dive on the fly to meet the
ball.
Two recent papers examined these
important aspects of decision making
that are often obscured in studies utilizing
the standard 2AFC paradigm (Kiani and
Shadlen, 2009; Resulaj et al., 2009).
Both studies used modified versions of
a now-classic 2AFC task used to study
visual motion discrimination (Shadlen
and Newsome, 2001). Typically, subjects
are asked to judge the direction of motion
of a field of dots moving stochastically on
a computer monitor. On average, the dots
move either right or left, though the coher-
ence—the percentage of dots moving the
same direction at any given time—may
vary from just above 0% (random) to just
below 100% (uniform motion). Clearly,
the longer a subject is allowed to watch
the display, the more information he
obtains, and the more coherent the stim-
ulus, the less time is needed to reach
a conclusion.
Neurophysiological experiments in
monkeys, who reported the direction of
motion by shifting gaze to one of two
response targets (Gold and Shadlen,
2002; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Shad-
len and Newsome, 2001), have focused
on the responses of neurons in brain
areas linked to either decoding the direc-
tion of motion (e.g., the middle temporal
area, MT) or planning the eye movement
response (e.g., the lateral intraparietal
area, LIP). Neurons in MT, for example,
tend to fire in direct proportion to the
coherence of dot motion in their preferred
direction. LIP neurons (as well as neurons
in other areas within the visual orienting
system), by contrast, show a ramp up in
firing for motion favoring eye movementsElsevier Inc.in their preferred directions. Importantly,
the slope of this ramp in firing varies as
a direct function of dot coherence—
implying integration of sensory evidence
with respect to time. Moreover, firing
rates tend to saturate at a fixed level that
strongly predicts the time it takes the
monkey to make a choice. In what
appears to be a profound case of kismet,
this pattern of firing is precisely what is
predicted by computational models of
sensory decision making developed solely
to explain variation in decision accuracy
and reaction time by human observers
(Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Ratcliff, 1978;
Shadlen et al., 2006; Smith and Ratcliff,
2004).
However, just as the goalkeeper trying
to stop the penalty kick must dive either
left or right, regardless of the quality of
his evidence, 2AFC tasks that allow only
a fixed amount of time for sensory integra-
tion may obscure much of the information
encoded in the underlying neural signal.
That is, while a 500 ms observation of
dot motion may result in a saccade to
the right for both 5% and 75% motion
strengths, the animal’s underlying confi-
dence about the correctness of each
response may be drastically different. In
fact, in a study utilizing a time-limited
version of the dot-motion task, error trials
were typically preceded by periods in
which the accumulated firing rates in LIP
neurons remained low (Roitman and Shad-
len, 2002). If, as claimed, these firing rates
represented the ratio of evidence favoring
a saccade in the neuron’s preferred direc-
tion, low firing would imply roughly equal
evidence in favor of either alternative, sug-
gesting that most errors corresponded to
decisions made with low confidence.
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tested this hypothesis by offering mon-
keys a third option in the time-limited
version of the dot motion task while
recording from neurons in LIP (Kiani and
Shadlen, 2009). On a select subset of
trials, a third target appeared following
the stimulus presentation; selecting this
target always resulted in a reward, albeit
a smaller one than for a correct answer.
This is the equivalent of giving the keeper
a pass when he feels uncertain about
where the kick will go. Intuitively, mon-
keys will select the opt-out target when
they are less confident about what they
have seen. As expected, monkeys se-
lected this ‘‘sure’’ target more often for
weaker motion strengths and shorter
stimulus durations, resulting in improved
choice accuracy across all other trials,
implying that opt-out choices were made
when the evidence was weaker and confi-
dence lower. Moreover, by allowing the
animals to opt-out of the discrimination
task, the researchers could determine
which patterns of firing were associated
with low-confidence responses. Consis-
tent with the temporal integration hypoth-
esis, firing rates on opt-out trials remained
intermediate between very high (strong
evidence favoring eye movements in the
neuron’s preferred direction) and very
low (strong evidence favoring eye move-
ments opposite the neuron’s preferred
direction). Moreover, firing rates were
highest when monkeys shifted gaze in
the preferred direction of the neuron to
select the sure target, again consistent
with the idea that LIP neurons signal the
likelihood of that choice.
Though the three-option task elicited
only an implicit behavioral measure of
confidence, the Kiani and Shadlen results
confirm the predictions of the evidence
accumulation model and add to a growing
body of data on confidence-related neu-
ronal activity elsewhere in cortex (Hayden
et al., 2008; Kepecs et al., 2008). More
importantly, they are the first to demon-
strate how both a decision and its atten-
dant confidence judgment can be en-
coded in a single data stream—precisely
what would be expected from a norma-
tive, Bayesian decision making mecha-
nism. How such a code might relate to
the subjective experience of confidence
remains an open question, but this and
similar studies inform our understandingof how the brain organizes the information
available to it in the moments preceding
a decision.
Just as crucial as the moments pre-
ceding a decision, however, are the
moments following, in which organisms
can sometimes adjust their actions in light
of new information. In contrast with forced
choice tasks, most decisions in real envi-
ronments are not made in isolation, but
unfold as part of complex foraging or
mating policies that allow for adjustment,
update, and learning (Stephens and
Krebs, 1986). For example, a gazelle
moving through open grassland can
choose continually between attentive
listening and eating as she scouts for
predators. Although the keeper can often
only look on helplessly in mid-air as the
ball curves toward the other side of the
net, sometimes, after committing to a
course of action, the rapid accumulation
of new information permits him to alter
course mid-stride, changing action plans
in response to updated evidence.
Resulaj and collaborators studied a
striking example of this phenomenon in
human subjects performing the dot
motion discrimination task (Resulaj et al.,
2009). As with monkeys, subjects were
given up to 2 s of stimulus observation,
but unlike the monkeys, they registered
their decisions by moving a handle to
fixed locations to the left or right in front
of them. By requiring subjects to use the
comparatively slower arm movements,
obscuring these movements from view,
and turning off the stimulus as soon as
subjects began to reach, the experi-
menters created a situation in which
movement trajectories might be altered
by unprocessed visual information still
making its way through the visual stream
at the time of decision.
And indeed, this is exactly what Resulaj
and collaborators observed. On most
trials, subjects’ arm movements followed
trajectories curved toward their eventual
choice targets, but on a small subset,
the arcs began heading in one direction
before suddenly veering off in the
opposite direction—suggesting a change
of mind. This process, they showed,
increased the overall accuracy of final
decisions across all motion strengths
and was correlated with stimulus informa-
tion present up to 200 ms before subjects
started to move. These data suggest that,Neuron 63, Sin the time between decision and action,
the brain’s decision system continues to
process stimulus information entering
through the visual stream and integrates
this new evidence during the course of
movement.
To explain these postdecision correc-
tions, the researchers proposed the exis-
tence of a second, postdecision ‘‘change-
of-mind’’ bound. After accumulating
evidence reached the threshold to initiate
a movement, they argued, subjects con-
tinued to process further stimulus infor-
mation, with actions reversing course if
the subsequent evidence signal changed
more than a certain percentage in favor
of the alternative. Interestingly, fits of this
model to the behavioral data also sug-
gested a change-of-mind deadline, a
point of no return past which new evi-
dence could not alter subjects’ actions.
More broadly, the data imply that the
brain does not immediately dispose of
accumulated information after a decision
is made but maintains and updates these
signals online for the purpose of altering
ongoing behavior. Such findings not only
place decision making within a more
open-ended, naturalistic context, but also
emphasize its connection with motor plan-
ning circuitry and control theory (Shad-
mehr and Wise, 2005).
Together, these studies contribute to
an emerging picture of decision making
in which the decision itself takes place
amid more general processes of informa-
tion gathering and online control. By
offering insights into the brain’s capacities
for graded judgments and self-correction,
they may shed new light on the origins of
phenomena such as delusions and fixed
ideas that attend disorders such as
schizophrenia and obsessive-compulsive
disorder.
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